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Abstract. Social and socioeconomic interactions and transactions often require trust. In 
digital spaces, the main approach to facilitating trust has effectively been to try to reduce 
or even remove the need for it through the implementation of reputation systems.  These 
generate metrics based on digital data such as ratings and reviews submitted by users, 
interaction histories, and so on, that are intended to label individuals as more or less 
reliable or trustworthy in a particular interaction context.  We suggest that conventional 
approaches to the design of such systems are rooted in a capitalist, competitive 
paradigm, relying on methodological individualism, and that the reputation technologies 
themselves thus embody and enact this paradigm in whatever space they operate in.  We 
question whether the politics, ethics and philosophy that contribute to this paradigm align 
with those of some of the contexts in which reputation systems are now being used, and 
suggest that alternative approaches to the establishment of trust and reputation in digital 
spaces need to be considered for alternative contexts. 
 
Introduction 
Trust is a fundamental component of social relations.  It helps actors make 
decisions in situations where direct knowledge that can guide action and 
cooperation is not always immediately available.  Trust helps reduce complexity 
in social interactions, allowing actors to take decisions in situations which entail 
some risk (Luhmann, 1979). Interactions in a digital environment are likely to 
require trust (Hsu et al., 2007; Usoro et al., 2007) even more than those in a 
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physical environment.  While trust is often seen as a tri-partite relation between 
one individual (trustor) and another one (trustee) in relation to an object or 
outcome, it can also take a collective form in what is known as reputation, or how 
a community or group of people view the trustworthiness of another person or 
another entity.   
The increase in the availability of digital data is having a significant impact on 
our opportunities to engage in social interactions and the ways in which they are 
enacted. Increased digitization leads to increased remote and mediated 
interactions.  If we view humanity as a network: before the internet, interactions 
tended to be between nodes that were previously only separated by a few degrees; 
now the chances of creating a new connection/entering into a transaction or 
relationship with a previously very distant node are much higher, and the chances 
of the different parties to a social or economic transaction being physically co-
located are much reduced (Shu and Chuang, 2011). 
This has led to questions about how to establish trust in mediated interactions 
involving distant and/or unfamiliar actors, when: 
 
 We don’t know whether the person we’re interacting/transacting with is 
who they say they are. 
 We don’t know whether they have the goods, skills or knowledge they claim 
to have. 
 We don’t know whether their digital presence will persist, and so whether 
we will have any continued relationship (and therefore a chance to 
reciprocate or for comeback). 
 We can’t rely on local knowledge and word-of-mouth (reputation). 
 
One of the main ways in which online platforms have responded to this 
situation is through the development of reputation systems (Dellarocas, 2003; 
Jensen, Davis, & Farnham, 2002; Resnick et al., 2000).  These are systems that 
collate data in the form of feedback, ratings, and digital interaction/transaction 
histories, process them through algorithms, and produce a synthetic and very often 
quantitative measure intended to give a guide to an individual’s trustworthiness 
(Farmer and Glass, 2010). 
In a context/mission creep mirroring that of other business-intelligence 
inspired data analytics (Wilson et al., 2017), such systems are becoming 
increasingly ubiquitous, no longer confined to the trading and expert knowledge-
sharing sites they were originally developed for. Described by Masum and Zhang 
as a ‘distributed court of opinion’ (2004, n.p.) that will alleviate the strain on our 
overburdened ‘individual processing capacity’ (ibid.) in the face of vastly 
increased accessible data and so ‘help the same number of hours in the day go 
further’ (ibid.), great things are expected of them.  It has been suggested they 
could play pivotal roles in the creation and maintenance of good governance, 
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transparency and accountability in public office and commerce, through either the 
creation of trust or even – paradoxically – the removal of the need for it (Litos and 
Zindros, 2017; Masum, Tovey and Newmark, 2012; Masum and Zhang, 2004; 
Picci, 2007). But as they, or components such as ratings systems, permeate into 
perhaps unexpected digital spaces – such as learning environments1, community 
support groups (see, e.g., http://supportgroups.com) or even online communities 
of criminals needing to trust each other in the exchange of services and goods 
such as hacking and botnets (Décary-Hétu and Dupont, 2013; Dupont et al., 2016) 
– and as China moves to introduce a mandatory social credit system that 
incorporates elements of online reputation systems (Botsman, 2017) that attempts 
to reduce individuals to single measures of quality,  we need to ask questions 
about whether their design is commensurate with the intentions of the systems 
they are being brought into.   
It is now fairly accepted in certain areas of research, that technology and 
technical artefacts (including information and communication technologies) are 
not politically or morally neutral.  Winner (1980) argued that artefacts, very much 
like people, have their own politics which cause them to enact or contribute to 
particular types of ordered social system. He described the now well-known 
example of the low bridges on roads to Long Island from New York. Winner 
noticed that the low height of these bridges would exclude categories of people 
(those travelling on buses, generally working class people or African Americans) 
from certain actions, such as accessing a middle-class residential area. These low 
bridges thus embodied political decisions and enacted particular discriminations 
and exclusions.   
In relation to reputation systems, an important question arises concerning the 
political and moral decisions that these systems embody and carry into the digital 
spaces they operate in. One episode of the TV series Black Mirror, Nosedive2, 
takes the idea of ubiquitous reputation systems to the extreme; in so doing, it 
powerfully illustrates some of the political implications of reputation systems and 
their capacity to be the driver of social exclusion and inclusion.  In it, people use 
an app on their mobile phone to rate each other during or after any real 
interaction. In a plot move that has echoes of the developing Chinese social credit 
system (Botsman, 2017; Hvistendahl, 2017), those with high scores have access to 
better apartments and other perks.  On the other hand, those with low scores 
become social outcasts. This reputation system, then, constitutes an instrument for 
both upward and downward social mobility. Similarly to the low bridges 
                                                 
1  Virtual learning environments and learning management systems are increasingly making use of both 
the conceptual models and user-interfaces of business-intelligence applications, with examples such as 





described by Winner, the reputation system in Nosedive embodies a politics with 
rules of exclusion and inclusion which are enacted through and by the artefact. 
We suggest that conventional reputation systems are loaded with not just the 
values they are designed for (trust, honest behaviour, reliability), but also a more 
extended and subtle value-system: the political and ethical paradigm of the 
competitive, capitalist free market based on self-interested individuals.  Such 
systems are underpinned by a view of reputation that implicitly (and sometimes 
even explicitly) commoditizes it, positioning it as a capital (most explicitly in 
work such as Gandini (2016)) that is inherent to individuals, who can accumulate 
it, lose it and occasionally even speculate on it.   
This might be appropriate for a digital system that is intended to serve as a 
competitive market, for example an e-commerce website, or to function within a 
platform capitalist model.  However, this may not be the case in other contexts, 
where a different political, ethical or philosophical paradigm underpins the 
construction or enactment of the digital space. 
In the following, we describe the main features of conventional reputation 
systems and show why we believe they embody and enact a fundamentally 
market-based, capitalist paradigm.  We then examine various contexts in which 
such systems, or parts of them, operate, including trading sites (eBay/Etsy/gig 
economic sites), expert question-and-answer (Q&A), and supportive discussion 
forums, and ask whether the properties and features of these systems are likely to 
encourage the kinds of behaviours that participants in and designers of these sites 
may wish for. Finally, we offer some preliminary observations associated with a 
project we are working on in the area of Collective Awareness Platforms for 
Social Innovation, whose goal is to facilitate a novel form of welfare – termed 
commonfare (Fumagalli and Lucarelli, 2015) – among people who have 
experienced conditions of poverty or precariousness.  We argue that the dominant 






Trust and reputation systems in digital spaces 
Common features of online reputation systems 
Online reputation systems are systems that draw on data about a user’s activities 
to generate an indication of that user’s standing within one or more online 
communities (Dellarocas, 2003; Jensen, Davis, and Farnham, 2002; Resnick et al., 
2000).  In some ways similar to the points systems and leader-boards common to 
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online games, in which points are sought competitively and assigned by the game; 
the “capital” nature of such points is made clear in those games that allow players 
to “spend” their points within the game-world.   
Reputation systems outside of games have a stronger focus on providing users 
with a metric on which to base judgments about whether to trust other users or 
select them as partners for a transaction.  They are now default parts of the design 
of e-commerce sites, where items are bought and sold in conventional financial 
transactions.  They are also integral to the increasing number of sites based on a 
“gig” (Friedman, 2014) or “sharing” (Hamari, Sjöklint, and Ukkonen, 2015) 
economic model.  (In the former, members offer their skills and services for 
money but in a freelance capacity; in the latter, they provide or/and seek resources 
such as tools, transport or accommodation without the exchange of money.)  In 
addition, many expert Q&A sites (usually based on discussion forum rather than 
trading structures) employ reputation systems so that questioners can judge 
whether or not to trust an answer, or community members can build up their own 
reputation as experts (see, e.g., Movshovitz-Attias et al., 2013).  For participants 
in these latter sites, high reputation scores may also be seen as badges of 
achievement or honour – measures of kudos, as indicated by the name of the 
reputation scores in the online expert coder community StackOverflow 
(Movshovitz-Attias et al., 2013; Bosu et al., 2013).  The inclusion of reputation 
systems in a digital space may thus also be seen as a form of gamification, 
providing motivation to contribute more and higher quality postings or items in a 
knowledge-sharing community. 
Reputation systems can base reputation measures on data from a range of 
sources, processed in a range of ways (Costagliola, Fuccella and Pascuccio, 2014; 
Hendrikx, Bubendorfer and Chard, 2015; Vavilis, Petković and Zannone, 2014).  
They may employ data generated directly from a user’s activities, such as how 
many times they visit a site, how long they spend on a site, how many transactions 
they complete, the ratio of completed to started transactions, how many 
contributions they make to a discussion, how many network ties they have, and so 
on.  They may also draw on ratings of that user’s contributions/behaviour 
provided by other users: for example, through “likes,” up- and down-votes, ratings 
against particular reputation-items such as helpfulness, reliability, promptness 
etc., or qualitative feedback in the form of text-based reviews.  When reputation 
systems are intended to support transactions of a trading nature (whether as part of 
the conventional, gig or sharing economy), an entity’s reputation score might be 
based on customer feedback about reliability, product quality, speed of response, 
etc.  When they are intended to support expert discussion forums or interest 
groups, reputation scores may be based on other users’ judgments of the quality of 
an individual’s contributions to the site, number of contributions, and so on.  In 
either case, reputation metrics are intended to serve as proxies (Floridi, 2015) for 
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prior experience and personal knowledge, on the basis of which predictions of 
future interactions can be made.   
Whichever factors are included in a reputation system, they are often used to 
generate a numerical measure of the user’s overall behaviour/reputation/ranking 
within the relevant community (despite Masum and Zhang’s caution that ‘No 
person can be reduced to a single measure of “quality”’ (2004, np)).  Reputation 
“scores” may be made public to other community members, so that they can make 
decisions about how and with whom they interact; or they may be known only to 
the site administrators (or an automated process) and used to make decisions 
about allowing or removing privileges within, and even access to, services and 
users within the space.  In the former case, they will also be visualized on the 
interface of the service (e.g., using star-ratings or badges).  Scores may be 
aggregates or averages; the data used to calculate these scores may be unweighted 
or weighted according to a range of factors, including the reputation of the user 
submitting the ratings and the age of the rating. 
 
Trust and reputation as forms of capital 
The notion of online reputation has received substantial attention in recent years, 
with some authors suggesting that the increasing digitization of transactions and 
interactions is leading to a “reputation society” (Masum, Tovey and Zhang, 2012) 
and others proposing that reputation is in fact social capital in a “reputation 
economy” (Gandini, 2016).   
As evident from the description in the previous sub-section, online reputation 
systems have been developed for two general purposes: as tools to help users of 
web-based platforms make decisions about whom to trust; and as motivators for 
more and higher quality participation in certain web-based activities or 
communities.  Such systems are based on the premise that ‘reputation becomes 
visible, tangible and, under certain conditions, even measurable … through 
algorithms and metrics that elaborate online reputation scores’ (Gandini, 2016, 
28). Some authors suggest that this kind of measurement and sharing of reputation 
information could radically shift the balance of power in society, as ‘peer 
networks will confer legitimacy on people emerging from the grassroots’ 
(Newmark, 2012, ix).   
We can explore more what kind of politics may be embodied in conventional 
reputation system designs, and see how this politics is re-inscribed back into 
online communities. These systems appear to be based on individualism, the free 
market as the ideal (political) economy and liberalism as the essence of social 
relations.  For example, Dellarocas, one of the most influential theorists of these 
type of systems, states that ‘[t]he new platforms may be all about harnessing 
crowds and communities, but in the end, those crowds and communities are 
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nothing but a sum of individuals’ (2010, 33), an attitude that neglects the 
sometimes strong and complex social, political and cultural mechanisms that 
couple individuals and result in emergent, collective behaviour.  Similarly, Picci 
explicitly positions his arguments as rooted in rational choice theory, positing that 
‘individual social actors act to advance their self-interest’ (2007, np) and claiming 
that reputation systems ‘allow selection forces to weed out the least fit’ (ibid.). 
Gandini’s claim that reputation is social capital rests on the belief that it is ‘an 
eminently economic concept’ (2016, 30) that ‘functions as a form of currency 
enabling trust among strangers’ (ibid., 32) and that is ‘a resource that may be 
mobilized and that remains with the individual … as a capital that is invested, 
traded or managed … as an investment in social relations with expected economic 
return’ (ibid., 36), a view that combines individualism with a clear 
commoditization of reputation. 
One might ask whether reputation systems as currently developed are more 
likely to reinforce self-interested individualism, since they are grounded in a 
methodological individualism which sees social groups as aggregations of 
individuals, each aiming at self-satisficing egoistic behaviour, under the often not 
explicit idea that this is done for the benefit of the whole group. As Adam Smith 
famously stated, ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest’ 
(Smith 1838, 7).  
Paradoxically, some aspects of this kind of thinking appear to have been taken 
to extremes in the (nominally socialist) Chinese government’s recent experiments 
with and planned national roll-out of a combined social and personal-financial 
credit system (Botsman, 2017; Hvistendahl, 2017).  In these, conventional 
measures of financial credit-worthiness are being combined with behavioral 
metrics including shopping habits, friendship networks and the sharing of 
‘positive energy’ (Botsman, 2017, n.p.) online to produce a single trustworthiness 
or social credit score. 
However, if reputation is viewed as a currency or marketable commodity, 
resulting from action of self-interested individuals, then it may be exposed to the 
same risks and problems that arise in financial markets, including questions 
related to ownership, fairness and control.  Indeed, the global financial crisis has 
led to renewed questions as to the validity of competitive, free-market models and 
suggestions that approaches that recognize the strong coupling of different 
components in the system should be developed (Helbing and Kirman, 2013).  
Within the economics of reputation and trust that reputation systems are helping 
to create, there is already evidence for the kind of problems that arise when 
financial gain can be made by adopting certain behaviours, including the use of 
multiple or fake personas to acquire undeserved reputational credit/value, 
exaggerated reciprocity, individualised reciprocity resulting in clique formation, 
retaliation and clique-based attacks. 
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For example, there have been several studies of eBay’s reputation system and 
the impact it has on participation in the system (see, for example, Cabral and 
Hortaçsu, 2010; Dellarocas, Fan and Wood, 2004; Houser and Wooders, 2006; 
Hui et al., 2014; Resnick et al., 2000; Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002; Resnick, 
Zeckhauser and Swanson, 2006).  The main findings of this research suggest that 
feedback contributions on eBay are not strongly driven by altruism (Dellarocas, 
Fan and Wood, 2004), and instead are more strongly driven by an expectation of 
reciprocity.  Resnick et al.  (2000) suggest that users not only reciprocate but also 
retaliate.  They also suggest that users of the site become less likely to participate 
in the feedback process once they have accumulated experience (and 
“respectable” reputation scores).  This observation is consistent with the 
suggestion that users’ participation in the feedback process is not strongly driven 
by altruism, as it may imply that once users have built up a secure reputation, they 
no longer feel the need to elicit ratings from others by providing ratings 
themselves.  Resnick, Zeckhauser and Swanson (2006) showed that reputation is, 
however, important, and that the same items, sold by the same seller under two 
different identities, attracted an 8% lower price when sold through a newly-
established identity with low reputation, as compared to the seller’s “real” (well-
established, high reputation) identity.  Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) studied the 
impact of negative feedback, finding that the first time a seller receives negative 
ratings/feedback has a more significant impact on his/her sales than subsequent 
negative ratings, but also that once a seller receives a negative rating, they are 
much more likely to receive more.  They also found that sellers with low 
reputations are more likely to exit the system.  Reputation systems, then, may not 
only enact a market-based, accumulative and acquisitive capitalist paradigm in 
whatever digital spaces they are employed – but also risk introducing behaviours 
that are detrimental to the health and sustainability of those spaces.   
While a market-based view of reputation may be acceptable and even desirable 
in a business-focused trading site, it may undermine the intentions and purported 
values of other types of site.  For example, although expert Q&A sites could be 
viewed as markets for knowledge, with competition among providers to supply 
the best quality knowledge, they are not real markets in the sense that there is no 
obvious cost to those seeking (and presumably consuming) the knowledge on 
offer and knowledge-providers retain the knowledge that they give out.  Instead, a 
closer comparison might be with school or university learning environments, or 
sites of professional learning, where knowledge, once created, can be distributed 
and shared at no loss to any party to the sharing transaction.  Rather than the 
power dynamics of a market, governed by competition and differentiation in 
wealth, expert Q&A sites are more likely to be characterised by dynamics of pride 
and commitment to the advancement and promotion of particular forms of 
knowledge and skill.  In this kind of context, reputation might still take the form 
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of something to be accumulated, but not so much at the expense of other actors 
competing for the same resources and capital.   
Indeed, it seems that some reputation systems used in expert Q&A sites, such 
as that incorporated in StackOverflow, reflect some of these differences.  
StackOverflow is a Q&A site where programmers can ask and answer questions 
relating to technical issues, and it has probably the best-known and most 
elaborately-developed reputation system in a Q&A site (Bosu et al., 2013; Hart & 
Sarma, 2014; Movshovitz-Attias et al., 2013).  In StackOverflow’s reputation 
system, users can up-vote and down-vote questions and answers provided by 
others, actions that not only contribute to reputation-building but also move 
questions up and down in terms of the order of display, and so make them more or 
less visible.  Users gain and lose reputation in a variety of ways, including through 
the up- and down-voting of questions; there are many more ways to gain 
reputation than to lose it.  The most significant way to lose reputation points 
involuntarily is if a post is flagged as offensive or spam; points can also be 
“spent” (transferred to another user) in a bounty system for those seeking quick 
and accurate answers to complex or esoteric questions. 
In StackOverflow, points are converted into privileges: for example once a user 
has 15 points, they can vote up a question or answer; once they have, 20, they can 
talk in a chat; once they have 125, they can vote down questions or answers; and 
so on.  At 1500 points users are allowed to add new tags to the site (questions are 
tagged as corresponding to particular topic areas, such as SQL or java); at 200, 
users can edit other users’ questions and answers.  At 10000 points users gain 
moderation rights; at 25000, they have access to the site’s analytics.  Thus there 
are incentives to build one’s reputation that go beyond the acquisition of 
reputation for its own sake, or in order to gain the trust of other users. 
However, this reputation system is still grounded in an individualistic, 
accumulative and competitive paradigm, which may have negative consequences 
for the diffusion of professional knowledge. For example, Movshovitz-Attias et 
al.  (2013) found that while the majority of questions on the site were posted by 
novice users with low reputations, on average higher reputation users ask more 
questions than lower reputation users, simply because they contribute more often 
to the site. StackOverflow has also been found to (unintentionally) exclude or 
discourage female participants (Vasilescu et al., 2012), which has been partially 
attributed to the reward system.  Thus StackOverflow’s reputation system, while 
already incorporating some features that better reflect the aims of expert-
community knowledge sharing and creation, may still to some extent undermine 
its aims and ethos. 
Moving away from the traditional spaces in which reputation systems were 
developed, systems based on the same principles are also increasingly being 
incorporated into digital spaces that set out to bypass commercial transactions and 
achieve cooperative or mutualistic transactions.  For example, the 
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accommodation-arranging platform Couchsurfing.com positions itself as setting 
out to achieve a social good: ‘We envision a world made better by travel and 
travel made richer by connection.  Couchsurfers share their lives with the people 
they encounter, fostering cultural exchange and mutual respect’ (Couchsurfing, 
2016).  Couchsurfing.com relies on substantial levels of trust between strangers, 
as users share their homes with each other without any monetary exchange.   
Lauterbach (2009) showed that there are significant levels of both direct and 
generalized reciprocity within the overall couchsurfing community.  
Couchsurfing’s reputation system is based on systems used in conventional 
economic trading sites but has two unusual features.  The first is in its use of 
friendship ties.  Users can identify the type of relationship they have with other 
users, choosing from: Haven’t met yet, Acquaintance, CouchSurfing friend, 
Friend, Good friend, Close friend, and Best friend.  Couchsurfers who have 
hosted or stayed with other members are permitted to submit private feedback (to 
Couchsurfing) and public references for 14 days after a stay.  Members must have 
a couch request with the “Yes” “Maybe” or “Confirmed” status in order to leave a 
Surf/Host reference.  Other members may create references under the “Other” or 
“Friend” reference designations (as opposed to “Surf” or “Host”).  Users’ publicly 
visible reputation information is simply the number of references they have been 
given, and the number of those that are positive and have been confirmed (i.e., the 
user has confirmed the host/guest exchange).  Other users can see free text 
references left by former guests/hosts.   
It seems that this qualification of feedback based on the nature of relationships 
may be an attempt to mitigate the pure free-market nature of a conventional 
ratings-based system, in which every opinion counts the same, no matter how 
well-informed.  However, Couchsurfing has a second unusual feature, which may 
be an example of how a reputation system can undermine the stated ethos of a 
platform.  After some years of operating with the system described above, 
Couchsurfing.com introduced an additional “vouching” system, to allow some 
users to increase their reputation levels.  This very restrictive system allows users 
to vouch for other users only if they have received three or more “vouches” 
themselves, effectively restricting vouching to an elite core: in, 2009, only 6.8% 
of members were able to vouch (Lauterbach et al., 2009).  Thus the use of a 
conventional reputation system – albeit with some modifications – may in fact 
represent a misalignment with Couchsurfing’s stated values of opening up 
sociocultural spaces and recognizing the contribution to this endeavour made by 







Reputation systems in supportive groups 
Finally, we consider another context in which reputation systems sometimes 
appear: that of supportive discussion forum sites.  On the surface, these may seem 
to be similar to the expert Q&A forums considered in the previous section – 
discussion boards to which users can post questions that they are seeking answers 
to from community members with similar interests and pre-occupations.  
However, there are some fundamental differences to the aims and use of such 
sites. 
First, expert Q&A sites such as StackOverflow are professional/technical 
interest community sites. Their users tend to be people who already have some 
degree of technical expertise (and therefore knowledge and cultural capital) and 
are seeking more. Several things follow from this: 
 Questions on sites such as StackOverflow are technical in nature, seeking 
specific solutions to specific coding, implementation or operating system 
problems.  
 They are likely to have answers which can be clearly judged as right, wrong 
or useful, depending on whether these answers lead to solutions that the 
questioner (and other members of the community) can implement.  Where 
there may be more than one correct answer/workable solution, some will be 
more efficient or simpler to implement than others, and can be judged better 
on those grounds. 
 Because users have some existing level of expertise, their judgment as to the 
value of answers might be expected to be reasonably reliable. 
 Users are often enthusiasts for their work, and so are discussing something 
they enjoy doing.  They are also proud of their expertise and are keen to 
provide answers if they have them. 
 Questions (and answers) on sites such as StackOverflow are almost never 
personal or emotional; they are rarely likely to be of dramatic importance to 
the questioner’s life or living conditions. 
 
In contrast, the stories that may be told, and the advice and guidance sought 
and given on community support discussion forums, for example relating to 
health issues or financial problems, may relate to issues which are of substantial 
personal significance to users. There are many such communities, some facilitated 
by charities, health systems, or other authoritative figures or structures, but others 
having a more grass roots or community-driven character (see, for example, 
Barak, Boniel-Nissim and Suler, 2008; Chung, 2013). Many are associated with 
particular illnesses, whether physical or mental (see, for example, Eysenbach et 
al., 2004; Griffiths et al., 2009; Wright and Bell, 2003). Some discussion forums 
and mailing lists have developed to provide a safe space for minority groups such 
as the LGBTQI community (Mehra, Merkel, and Bishop, 2004). Others provide 
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discussion forums for larger groups, a good example being the parenting forum 
Mumsnet (Pedersen and Smithson, 2013).   
While reputation scores are not yet widespread among such sites, they have 
found their way into some of them.  For example, the set of discussion forums 
hosted by the platform supportgroups.com, which includes forums dedicated to 
financial problems, homelessness, anxiety, and other mental and physical health 
issues, has a linked reputation system so that users can acquire points for 
contributing across the forums they contribute to.  The use of reputation systems 
in digital spaces that might attract vulnerable, socially-isolated or excluded people 
may be of particular concern.  There is a well-established correlation between 
poverty/financial uncertainty and depression/anxiety (see, for example, Belle 
Doucet, 2003; Galea et al., 2007; Murali and Oyebode, 2004; Murphy and 
Athanasou, 1999; Paul and Moser, 2009; Vinokur, Price and Kaplan, 1996), 
which is not surprising given the potential for experiences of precariousness, 
social exclusion and social isolation, and feelings of inadequacy and decreasing 
hope. While people may well have positive stories and strategies to share, they 
may often be describing how they overcame a difficulty that was quite an 
unpleasant experience. Similarly, those visiting the site in order to find help and 
advice may well be seeking the emotional, as well as practical, support that can be 
provided by a community of people experiencing similar difficulties.   We might 
speculate on the potential impact of inscribing a capitalist-oriented reputation 
system into such an environment. While on the one hand users might value trust 
creation processes as they decide who to interact with and seek support from, it is 
easy to imagine situations in which reputation scores might have negative 
impacts, for example on users’ self-esteem.  Given the value-system inherent in 
the design of conventional reputation systems, reputation may represent another 
form of capital in which users can find themselves to be poor, and so another 
benchmark of failure, inadequacy and inequity. 
 
Toward the Commonfare.net platform: Trust, 
reputation and shared values 
We are involved in a Collective Awareness Platform for Social Innovation project 
which is currently building a mobile and web platform called commonfare.net. 
The goal of this digital space is to foster a new form of bottom-up, community 
welfare, called commonfare (Fumagalli and Lucarelli, 2015).  The project hopes 
to help alleviate the consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis in Europe 
and the failure of state-based approaches to welfare to improve the living 
conditions of those at risk of or experiencing precarity and social exclusion.  The 
project (Botto and Teli, 2017) adopts a participatory design approach and the 
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original intention was to include a fairly conventional reputation system based on 
user ratings. Evidence from both the analysis of existing reputation systems and 
preliminary results from working with community members contributing to the 
design process strongly suggested that this might undermine the values and ethos 
of the site. Moreover it became clear that having solutions promoting this ethos is 
far more important to them than having access to individualistic reputation 
metrics. 
In the following, we provide a brief description of the commonfare concept and 
of the Commonfare.net platform and initially suggest that in this platform genuine 
trust is unlikely to be facilitated by conventional reputation systems based on an 
individualistic, acquisitive market paradigm. We then present a set of points 
which will guide our future work designing a reputation system for the platform. 
The Commonfare.net project is dedicated to the development of a mobile-first, 
web-based platform through which to improve the lives of people experiencing 
economic and social exclusion or precarity in Europe, through the promotion and 
facilitation of commonfare, an alternative approach to social welfare (Fumagalli 
and Lucarelli, 2015).  A commonfare approach is grounded in the recognition that 
the social and economic are not separate spheres, but instead are inextricably and 
intricately connected.  Commonfare is: 
 bottom-up 
 socially equitable 
 cooperative 
Key features of a commonfare approach include proper management of the 
common (both physical commons such as water, land and so on and immaterial 
commons such as knowledge and affect); an unconditional, basic income for all; 
and the development of complementary financial circuits.  Any digital space that 
attempts to encourage a commonfare approach must therefore have design 
processes and features that are consistent with its core principles of bottom-up, 
socially equitable and cooperative action. 
Participants in the design process include individuals and community members 
representing unemployed and precarious young people (Croatia), precarious 
workers (Italy and the Netherlands), non-Western migrants (the Netherlands) and 
benefit recipients (the Netherlands).  Commonfare.net is intended to be a 
collective awareness platform that facilitates the development of commonfare 
approaches to social welfare among its users.  Commonfare.net will offer a 
complementary channel for the provision of social welfare, allowing users to take 
better advantage of State offerings as well as to create their own alternative 
support and empowerment mechanisms.  (For more detail, see Botto and Teli 
(2017).) 
As is evident from the above, the philosophy behind commonfare.net is one 
that values the provision of mutual support and activities that lead to communal 
benefit rather than self-interested individualism. To an extent, it is more similar to 
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the case of community support groups than to those of an e-commerce website or 
a technical Q&A site.  This means that cooperation and collaborative action will 
be essential to the development of a strong and valuable commonfare.  To achieve 
this, the platform will offer various ways for people to interact; commonfare.net 
will be a digital space that enables information provision, inspiration/motivation 
and community building through story-telling, and cooperative/mutually 
beneficial actions.  This last might include exchanges of goods, skills, knowledge 
or services in a sharing economy, group creation/cooperation, and forums for 
supportive Q&A.  Trust will be important in facilitating and encouraging all of 
these interactions and some kind of trust facilitation or reputation system is 
needed; however our analysis of existing reputation systems and initial results 
from empirical research show the need for a novel approach, which is not based 
on individualistic principles. Rather, what is needed is an approach that reinforces 
relationality and community cooperation. Our preliminary proposals for the 
reputation system for the commonfare.net platform are that it should be based on 
the following explicitly political, values-driven principles: 
 Rejection of individualism in the face of a widespread desire to feel part of a 
community with shared values, especially one which cooperates and acts in 
a mutualistic way to increase the quality of life of the many. 
 Valuing self-determination, autonomy, and freedom from conditionalities 
such as those imposed by the State, non-governmental authorities such as 
NGOs, and capitalist entities such as employers and big businesses, when 
they provide welfare support and help. The reproduction of trust models 
often associated with these entities will not necessarily facilitate the 
achievements of the project goals. 
 Acknowledgement that building (and warranting) trust in the platform will 
be as or even more important than trust in the individuals a user might 
potentially interact with. 
 Recognition of the danger of creating, and a desire to avoid, new forms of 
rather fragmented solidarity that may result in overly-segregated group 
formation and hence obstacles to the diffusion of knowledge and good 
practice.  This may necessitate the public availability and active sharing of 
information that shows the different groups’ levels of contribution and 
commitment to the shared goal of building the commonfare. 
These principles, which have emerged strongly and consistently in our 
participatory research activities, appear to be fundamentally at odds with the 
methodological individualism of a competitive, acquisitive market in reputation 
as a form of capital.  They thus direct us to re-think reputation and trust 
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